The agency and the hill: CIA’s relationship with Congress 1946-2004.

• Lowenthal, M., 205-229. (Reserved readings.)
• Snider, L. B. (2008). The agency and the hill: CIA’s relationship with Congress 1946-2004. (optional Reserved readings.)
• Snider, L. B. (1997). Congress as a user of intelligence: Sharing secrets with lawmakers, Studies in Intelligence. (optional, Reserved readings.)(add to syllabus)
• Elkins, 3-12 to 3-14; Chap 8.
• Intelligence authorization act for fiscal year 2013. (Reserved readings.)
Weekly Topic(s)
1. Congressional Role (Part 2) –
the players
2. Budget Resolution
3. Authorization process
Lecture 7
Congressional Role (Part 2) – The Players
“With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 the Congress itself now had a new intelligence role. From 1947 until 1974 the executive branch dominated intelligence policy. Congress still had a significant role in that the legislative branch appropriated funds for the intelligence community. However, for the most part, the Congress was willing to defer to executive branch leadership. The activities of the intelligence community were overseen by a few senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations committees in each chamber and, virtually all of this oversight was conducted behind closed doors.” (Smist, 4) But after the revelations of misdeeds that were exposed by the Church and Pike Committee investigations in the mid-1970s, the Congress tightened up its oversight of intelligence. The intent was to make oversight formal, documented, routine, and as much as legitimate security considerations allowed, more transparent. To do this each chamber established its own select oversight committee, with term limits to allow over time a broader participation by its members. “Select” indicates that the committee makeup is selected by the leadership and not determined by seniority or the normal party caucus procedures.
Read Elkins’ description of the Senate and House intelligence committees, pp 3-12 to 3-14.
Elkins points out the major differences between the committees. In the House the intelligence committee is called a “permanent” select committee, because all other select committees are dissolved at the end of a numbered Congress (every two years) under the rule of the House. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSC(I)) tends to be more concerned with budgetary matters than its Senate counterpart. It also has a stronger charter than its Senate counterpart and can deal with all aspects of intelligence, both MIP as well as NIP, while the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSC(I)) shares jurisdiction with the more politically powerful Senate Armed Services Committee and has no formal jurisdiction over the MIP. Years ago, when Senator Boren (OK) was chairman of the SSC(I) he attempted to strengthen the jurisdiction of his committee to be more aligned with that of the HPSCI. However, this was blocked in the Senate by those serving on Armed Services. The fact that any Intelligence Authorization bill (which concerns the NIP) that is reported out of the SSC(I) must be “sequentially referred” to the Armed Services Committee, and also approved by it, demonstrates that the SSC(I) is of less power than Armed Services. HPSCI organization roughly reflects the political balance in the House, with a majority chair and minority ranking member, supported by majority (larger) and minority professional staffs. The SSCI is more non-partisan, the majority party has an advantage of one seat, and the ranking minority is vice chair. The staff is non-partisan, though a recent expansion provides each Senator a designated professional staffer for individual support.
Which are the other committees involved in intelligence? In the Senate, when the SSC(I) was established its membership was to include senators who also served on the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Judiciary Committee. Each of these committees had legitimate interests in intelligence-related topics, but there were concerns of having sensitive intelligence source material spread all over Capitol Hill. Therefore the agreement reached was that intelligence matters would be concentrated in the SSC(I) and the interlocking membership would serve to ensure that the interests of the other committees were represented. To date, this has largely worked. Note, however, that the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, which has jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security, is not represented through interlocking membership. The SSC(I) was established in 1976, almost three decades before the establishment of a committee on homeland security. The Senate Appropriations Committee is also involved in intelligence. The great majority of Intelligence appropriations, that for all DOD NIP, ODNI and CIA funding and all MIP, are handled by the Subcommittee on Defense, since those are embedded in the Defense Budget for security reasons.
While the Permanent Select Committee enjoys dominance in intelligence matters in the House of Representatives, other committees at times become involved in intelligence matters. When chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Edward Boland opposed US covert action funding for rebels in Angola and in Nicaragua and authored an amendment to an appropriations act that outlawed funding for these activities. The House Armed Services Committee was heavily involved in the intelligence community reorganization activity that resulted in the establishment of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the predecessor to the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA). The House Appropriations Committee handles all intelligence appropriations matters independently of the HPSC(I).
Since 9/11 homeland security has been a high profile political issue. Consequently, many on Capitol Hill have sought the limelight of being involved in protecting the homeland. When a new cabinet-level department focused on homeland security was created by amalgamating 22 previously unassociated agencies into one department, many on Capitol Hill claimed responsibility for oversight. Consequently, many committees share oversight and budget responsibility for the Department of Homeland Security. It is a virtual labyrinth of overlapping jurisdictions. At one point 88 separate committees and subcommittees required the Department to report to each. Even though the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is the principal oversight and budget authorization committee, others are also involved, including the SSC(I), which addresses the National Intelligence Program funded portions of the department (i.e., the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the Coast Guard Intelligence Program). The House Committee on Homeland Security has a subcommittee on Terrorism and Intelligence the charter of which overlaps with that of the HPSC(I).
The Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence jurisdiction includes intelligence and information sharing efforts within the Department of Homeland Security, including the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence functions of component agencies; terrorist travel and financing; information sharing with Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement; fusion centers; terrorism threat advisories and warnings; classification issues; and the United States Secret Service. (http://homeland.house.gov/subcommittee-on-counterterrorism-and-intelligence)
The Congress, of course, is the political branch of government.
For those of you who are interested in politics, policy, and government relations I recommend two monographs by L. Britt Snider. Snider was a lawyer on the staff of the Church committee investigating the intelligence community in the 1970s. Later he served as general counsel for the Senate Intelligence Committee. He also had extensive experience on the staff of the Secretary of Defense and at CIA, where he was the Inspector General from 1998 to 2001. He was staff director of theAspin/Brown Commission that examined the structure of the intelligence community in 1995 – 1996. He is a member of the Public Interest Declassification Board, appointed by President Bush.
Snider’s 1997 monograph, Congress as a user of intelligence (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency) is in Reserved Readings. It examines the evolution of Congress’s employment of intelligence for its own purposes. As Snider notes, “[a]s intelligence sharing with Congress has grown… so too have tensions between the Intelligence Community and the rest of the executive branch.” (Snider (1997), iv) He describes the “rules” that have evolved for this sensitive relationship.In his later monograph on the history of CIA’s relationship with Congress, Snider provides one of the more complete and insightful histories that exist on this topic. Snider, L. Britt (2008). The agency and the hill: CIA’s relationship with Congress 1946-2004. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, is also in Reserved Readings.
Neither of these are mandatory readings for this course. But they are important studies that belong on any intelligence officer’s personal bookshelf.
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Budget Resolution
Once Congress receives the president’s proposed budget it tries to establish a strategic plan for itself. That plan addresses both government revenues and expenditures and is expressed in the annual budget resolution. The process dates to 1974 when Congress responded to growing economic distress and deficits, and the bills for the Vietnam war competing with the growing costs of LBJ’s “Great Society.” New legislation created the budget committees, supported by a Congressional Budget Office CBO), and imposed a more disciplined Congressional process.
Read Elkins, pp 7-2 to 7-3, on the budget resolution process.
“Over the years, the budget committees have evolved into instruments of the House and Senate party leaderships.” “Several factors account for the strong role of party leaders in determining the [budget] resolution’s policy orientation.” “First, the budget resolution covers a broad swath of legislative issues: it deals with defense, agriculture, transportation, and just about every other area of legislative activity. Congress’s budget policies affect most major legislation, and there inevitably are disputes between the budget committees and other committees over the dollars and priorities to be accorded to particular areas.” “Second, the budget resolution is one of the most partisan matters that Congress takes up each year.” “Finally,… in many years it has been hard to assemble a majority in favor of the budget resolution. Party leaders make deals and apply pressure to get the resolution through the House and Senate. In lining up the votes, they have gained a strong voice in determining the orientation and content of the budget resolution.” (Schick, p 132)
The budget resolution constrains other committees of the Congress. Therefore, many fights emerge early in the Congressional calendar over the budget resolution to preclude the prohibition of expenditures favored by many legislators. “Deadlines [usually April 15] are missed because members often have more reasons to vote against the [budget] resolution than for it.” (Schick, p 138) The budget resolution gives a preview of the fiscal battles that will be fought on Capitol Hill in the subsequent months.
The budget resolution does not address intelligence expenditures, per se. They are grouped into the National Defense category (050 Account). Members of the intelligence committees have natural allies in the members of the armed services committees in opposing restrictions on the 050 account in budget resolution debates.
It is important to understand, as pointed out in the readings, that the budget resolution is not law. It is not signed by the president. It is a joint resolution by the House and Senate that applies only to the Legislative Branch. The provisions of the budget resolution, passed early in a congressional session, are often violated when the various authorization and appropriations acts are passed and signed into law by the president. Is the budget resolution process effective? To a certain extent, yes. Before its adoption in 1974 the process of authorization and appropriations on Capitol Hill was uncoordinated making enforcement of overall fiscal policy virtually impossible. Since then, there has at least been a process, albeit one dictated by politics, which more recently has sometimes resulted in gridlock.
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Authorization process
The committees of the Congress that authorize the expenditure of funds are also known as oversight committees. They do both functions.
Read Elkins’ summary of the authorization process, pp 7-3 to 7-5. Then read Lowenthal’s more nuanced treatment of oversight, pp 205-229. Remember that Lowenthal served as the staff director for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and has a unique insider’s perspective on the oversight of intelligence.
Schick points out that “Congress has two distinct processes for establishing and funding federal programs and agencies. One leads to the enactment of authorizing legislation, which establishes the legal basis for the operation of federal agencies and programs. The other culminates in the appropriation of money, which enables agencies to incur obligations and expenditures. These steps are usually taken in separate measures, but sometimes they are combined in direct spending legislation. The distinct actions are prescribed by House and Senate rules, which bar unauthorized appropriations and insertion of legislation into appropriation bills. Although the rules are sometimes waived or disregarded and allow for certain exceptions, they define the boundaries of authorizing legislation and appropriations measures.” (Schick, p 191) When Congress failed to pass an independent intelligence authorization bill for several years (2004 – 2009) authorizing language was included in the appropriations legislation to meet the requirement that appropriations are authorized.
“Congress can place almost any kind of provision in an authorization. It can prescribe what an agency must or may not do in carrying out assigned responsibilities. It can spell out an agency’s organizational structure and operating procedures. It can grant an agency broad authority or restrict its operating freedom by legislating in great detail.” “Since the 1970s, there has been a pronounced trend toward greater specificity in authorizing legislation.” (Schick, pp 194, 203)
“An authorization law looks in two directions: inward to Congress, where it serves as a license for the House and Senate to consider appropriations, and outward to federal agencies, where it licenses them to operate.” (Schick, p 194)
“… [C]ommittees that specialize in multi-year authorizations, such as the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, tend to be strong advocates for their programs, leading them to give more weight to program needs than to budget conditions.” (Schick, p 199) It is fair to say that the intelligence committees in both the House and Senate are generally advocates for the intelligence community, although intelligence authorizations are done annually.
Read Elkins, pp 8-1 to 8-6. He details the process for authorizing both National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program funds. Note the diagram that illustrates the complex process for a bill to follow from introduction to passage. Intelligence-related funds for the FBI and Homeland Security involve other committees as well as the SSC(I) and HPSC(I).
Read through the FY 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act (in reserved Readings).
The HPSC(I) and the SSC(I) hold multiple hearings each year on aspects of the intelligence budget and topics of concern. To see an example of an oversight hearing read [H.A.S.C. No. 112-22] Hearing on national defense authorization act for fiscal year 2012 and oversight of previously authorized programs before the committee on armed services, House of Representatives, one hundred twelfth Congress, first session, subcommittee on strategic forces hearing on budget request for national security space activities (in Reserved Readings). The HASC has been taking a progressively more active role in MIP authorization over the past several years, and now works that in parallel with the HPSC(I). Both committees discussion with the SASC on the National Defense Authorization Bill which includes the MIP. (Remember that the SASC never relinquished its MIP authorization responsibility to the SSC(I).)
This hearing is interesting from a number of perspectives. Read the opening statement by Congressman Michael Turner (Republican, Third District, OH), pp 5-8. While always polite (the hearing transcript will be public information), Chairman Turner reprimands the Executive Branch witness for failing to provide his prepared statement in advance in keeping with the committee’s rules. This illustrates how hearings are often scripted plays. Note also Chairman Turner’s focus on jobs in his home district. The third district of Ohio encompasses Dayton, OH, the home of Wright Patterson Air Force Base, which hosts the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC). Note also Chairman Turner’s questions (pp 31-33) that impact on both on NASIC and the National Reconnaissance Office, oversight of which falls within the purview of the House intelligence committee, not Armed Services.
To prepare for the last discussion, please read the FY2013 Intelligence Authorization Act in your weekly material.
Have a great week.

Week 7: Intelligence Committees
More than once in the past a joint committee of the House and Senate has been proposed to oversee intelligence and act as its authorizing committee. Suggest in a short paragraph, how one factor that would argue for or against the wisdom or utility of a joint committee to improve the current situation? Explain your position and list the sources you have used to formulate your position.
Week 7: HASC Hearings
Chairman Turner expressed a concern that the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, NASIC, was being restricted from doing original analysis in certain counter space areas despite their long history of technical expertise; he was “still uneasy with the current allocation of space intelligence analytical responsibilities”. Suggest one factor that might be at the root of his concern.
Week 7: Intelligence Authorization Act
In a short paragraph, identify a significant provision of the Intelligence authorization Act legislation and discuss why you think it is important.
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