Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE • VOL. LX, NO. 6 • DECEMBER 2005

MARK T. LEARY and MICHAEL R. ROBERTS∗ ABSTRACT
We empirically examine whether firms engage in a dynamic rebalancing of their capital structures while allowing for costly adjustment. We begin by showing that the presence of adjustment

costs has significant implications for corporate financial policy and the interpretation of previous empirical results. After confirming that financing behavior is consistent with the presence of

adjustment costs, we find that firms actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal range. Our evidence suggests that the persistent effect of shocks on leverage observed in

previous studies is more likely due to adjustment costs than indifference toward capital structure.

A TRADITIONAL VIEW IN CORPORATE FINANCE is that firms strive to maintain an optimal capital structure that balances the costs and benefits associated with varying degrees of financial

leverage. When firms are perturbed from this optimum, this view argues that companies respond by rebalancing their leverage back to the optimal level. However, recent empirical evidence has

led researchers to question whether firms actually engage in such a dynamic rebalancing of their capital structures. Fama and French (2002), among others, note that firms’ debt ratios adjust

slowly toward their targets. That is, firms appear to take a long time to return their leverage to its long-run mean or, loosely speaking, optimal level. Moreover, Baker and Wurgler (2002)

document that historical efforts to time equity issuances with high market valuations have a persistent impact on corporate capital structures. This fact leads them to conclude that capital

structures are the cumulative outcome of historical market timing efforts, rather than the result of a dynamic optimizing strategy. Finally, Welch (2004) finds that equity price shocks have a

long-lasting effect on corporate capital structures as well. He concludes that stock returns are the primary determinant of capital structure changes and that corporate motives for net issuing

activity are largely a
∗ Mark Leary is at The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University and Michael Roberts is at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. We thank Malcolm Baker, Michael Bradley, Qi Chen,

Murray Frank, David Hsieh, Roni Michaely, Sendhil Mullainathan, Mitchell Petersen, Gordon Phillips, Emma Rasiel, Oded Sarig, Robert Stambaugh (the editor), Karin Thorburn, Vish Viswanathan, Jose

Wynne; seminar participants at Duke University, Harvard University, Interdisciplinary Center of Herzliya, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of Pennsylvania; participants at the

2003 Financial Economics and Accounting Conference, the 2004 Econometric Society Meetings, the 2004 Southwestern Finance Association, the 2004 Midwest Finance Association, the 2004 Utah

Winter Finance Conference, the 2004 Western Finance Association, the 2004 Tuck Corporate Finance Conference; and especially an anonymous referee, Alon Brav, and John Graham for helpful

comments.

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mystery. These findings share the common theme that shocks to corporate capital structures have a persistent effect on leverage, which the last two studies interpret as evidence against firms

rebalancing their capital structures toward an optimum. Most empirical tests, however, implicitly assume that this rebalancing is costless: in the absence of adjustment costs, firms can

continuously rebalance their capital structures toward an optimal level of leverage. However, in the presence of such costs, it may be suboptimal to respond immediately to capital structure

shocks. If the costs of such adjustments outweigh the benefits, firms will wait to recapitalize, resulting in “extended excursions away from their targets” (Myers (1984)). These periods of

financing inactivity, induced by the presence of adjustment costs, have several implications for the dynamic behavior of capital structures and empirical studies seeking to understand

corporate financial policy. The goal of this paper is threefold. First, we explore the implications of costly adjustment for the interpretation of recent studies arguing against rebalancing. Is the

persistence that these studies find a consequence of firms failing to rebalance their capital structures in response to various shocks, or a consequence of costly adjustment? Second, we examine

whether, empirically, adjustment costs impact the financing decisions of firms. Direct evidence on external financing costs (e.g., Altinkilic and Hansen (2000)) provides several implications for the

temporal behavior of financing decisions that we test. Finally, we address the question of whether firms rebalance their capital structures by looking at the motivation behind incremental

financing decisions in a framework that accounts for costly adjustment. We begin by showing that the presence of adjustment costs results in shocks having a persistent effect on leverage,

despite active rebalancing behavior by firms. In light of this, we reexamine the conclusions of Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Welch (2004) and find that the persistence revealed by their empirical

tests is more likely due to adjustment costs, as opposed to indifference toward capital structure. Specifically, we find that the effect of Baker and Wurgler’s key market timing variable on

leverage attenuates significantly as adjustment costs decline, illustrating that adjustment costs appear to dictate the speed at which firms respond to leverage shocks. Our nonparametric and

duration analyses show that the effect of equity issuances on firms’ leverage is erased within two years by debt issuances. Similarly, the effect of large positive (negative) equity shocks on

leverage is erased within the two to four years subsequent to the shock by debt issuances (retirements). When we estimate Welch’s empirical model using simulated data from a dynamic tradeoff

model, we obtain results that are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to his, suggesting that his empirical model has little power to distinguish among alternative theories. We then show

that firms are often inactive with respect to their financial policy, but when they do issue or repurchase debt and equity, they do so in clusters. In almost 75% of our sample’s firm-quarter

observations, companies neither issue nor repurchase their own securities. However, they are still quite active, issuing or repurchasing securities once a year, on average. Further, when

Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures?

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firms do decide to visit the capital markets, they tend to do so in several closely spaced, often consecutive, quarters. This temporal pattern in financing decisions is consistent with the recent

empirical evidence of Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), who show that debt and equity issuance costs consist of both a fixed cost and a convex variable cost. This pattern is also consistent with the

provisions of SEC rule 10b-18, which restricts the timing and amount of share repurchases on any given day. Finally, we find that the motivations behind corporate financing decisions are

consistent with a dynamic rebalancing of leverage. Specifically, we find that firms are significantly more likely to increase (decrease) leverage if their leverage is relatively low (high), if their

leverage has been decreasing (accumulating), or if they have recently decreased (increased) their leverage through past financing decisions. Our rebalancing evidence is consistent with elements

of both the dynamic tradeoff model of Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) and the modified pecking order discussed in Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). Our finding of a significant

response to both low or decreasing leverage and high or increasing leverage is consistent with the existence of a target range for leverage, as in the dynamic tradeoff model. However, the

asymmetric magnitude of this effect is consistent with the dynamic pecking order’s prediction that firms are more concerned about excessively high leverage than excessively low leverage. In

addition, we find that more profitable firms and firms with greater cash balances are less likely to use external financing, while firms with large anticipated investment expenses are more likely

to use external financing. These results suggest that both the bankruptcy costs associated with debt financing and the information asymmetry costs associated with equity financing are

important determinants of capital structure decisions. However, more research focused specifically on the predictions of the pecking order is needed in order to distinguish between the

modified pecking order and traditional tradeoff theories. More broadly speaking, our results are also consistent with the survey evidence of Graham and Harvey (2001), who show that 71% of the

CFOs in their sample responded to having a target range for their debt-equity ratio and another 10% indicated having a “strict” target debt ratio. Graham and Harvey also show that managers

are concerned with the costs and benefits of debt financing (credit ratings, cash f low volatility, and tax shields are “important” or “very important” to almost half of those CFOs surveyed).

Finally, our rebalancing result is consistent with previous empirical work that finds mean reversion in leverage using partial adjustment models (e.g., Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Roberts (2001),

and Fama and French (2002)). It also explains why the rate at which leverage reverts to its target is often characterized as slow; firms do not rebalance every period and when they do, it is to a

target range rather than a specific level. When we estimate a partial adjustment model using simulated data from a tradeoff model with adjustment costs, we obtain reversion rates for the

leverage process similar to those reported in previous empirical studies. Hence, shocks to leverage have lasting effects despite active rebalancing.

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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the empirical implications of adjustment costs on the dynamics of financing behavior. Section II examines the results of

previous studies in light of these implications. Section III motivates our empirical approach and details the model, which addresses the issue of costly adjustment. Section IV discusses our data

and sample selection procedure, in addition to presenting summary statistics. Section V presents the estimation results and their implications for adjustment costs and theories of capital

structure. Section VI concludes. I. Implications of Adjustment Costs Depending on the form of adjustment costs, the implications for leverage dynamics can be significant. Most empirical

treatments have implicitly assumed that either financing is costless or the cost function is strictly convex. This assumption generates financing behavior that occurs continuously through time

(i.e., every period) and is the motivation behind the partial adjustment model found in many studies.1 However, in the presence of a fixed or proportional cost, continuous adjustment may no

longer be optimal. The effect of different adjustment costs on the dynamic behavior of optimizing agents has been shown in many contexts, including inventory management (Harrison (1985)),

cash management (Miller and Orr (1966)), investment policy (Caballero and Engle (1999)), portfolio selection (Constantinides (1979)), and capital structure (Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989)). The

most apparent effect of adjustment costs is generally periods of inactivity, as agents wait for the benefits of adjustment to become sufficient to offset the costs. For example, in the context of

the tradeoff model of Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), firms wait until the increased tax benefits offset the debt issuance costs before increasing their leverage.2 Regardless of the costs and

benefits associated with different financing decisions, the resulting size and frequency of external financings depends, in large part, upon the structure of the adjustment cost function. Figure 1

presents leverage ratios simulated under three different adjustment cost scenarios: a fixed cost (Panel A), a proportional cost (Panel B), and a fixed cost plus a weakly convex cost component

(Panel C). The simulations are carried out using a reduced form model of capital structure, which is parameterized to match various moments in the data. The details of the simulation procedure

may be found in Appendix A. Under a fixed cost regime, as in Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), the optimal control policy is to make one large adjustment upon reaching a boundary, thereby

returning leverage to its initial level (L∗ ). The intuition for this
1 See studies by Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Roberts (2001), Roper (2002), and Fama and French (2002) for explicit partial adjustment models. First-order autoregressions also implicitly assume a

continuous adjustment process, as they are a reparameterization of partial adjustment models. 2 A recent paper by Strebulaev (2004) presents another theoretical tradeoff model incorporating

adjustment costs that has similar implications.

Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures?
Panel A: Fixed Cost of Adjustment L L

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Panel B: Proportional Cost of Adjustment

Leverage

L*

L

Leverage
L

Time
Panel C: Fixed and Weakly Convex Cost of Adjustment L

Time

Leverage

L*

L* L

Time
Figure 1. Simulated leverage dynamics under different adjustment cost regimes. The figure presents simulated data under three different adjustment cost scenarios: fixed (Panel A), proportional

(Panel B), and fixed plus (weakly) convex (Panel C). The details of the simulations are discussed in Appendix A. Each figure presents an optimal leverage range, defined by lower (L) ¯ ¯ ) boundaries,

in which the firm is inactive with respect to its capital structure. Only and upper ( L when leverage touches (or crosses) a boundary does the firm initiate a recapitalization, the points of which

are denoted by the circles. The point to which the firm recapitalizes is dictated by the type of adjustment cost so that a fixed cost results in adjustments that return leverage to the initial

value (L∗ ); a proportional cost results in adjustments that keep leverage at the nearest boundary ¯ ); and, a fixed and weakly convex cost function returns leverage to a point in the interior of (L

or L ¯ optimal leverage range (either L∗ or L ¯ ∗ ). the ¯

policy is that once the benefits from adjustment outweigh the costs, the firm can make as large an adjustment as it desires because the cost and size of the adjustment are independent of one

another. The outcome of this policy is ¯ ), the illustrated in Panel A. Each time leverage touches a boundary ( L or L firm issues or retires debt to return leverage to its initial value ¯(L∗ ). Points of

recapitalization are denoted by the circles on the dotted line. The resulting leverage behavior is best described as “lumpy,” as firms irregularly make one relatively large adjustment. Thus, the

defining characteristics of a fixed cost and the corresponding recapitalization policy is that leverage adjustments are large and occur infrequently. Panel B presents the results of the optimal

control policy under a proportional cost function.3 This cost structure penalizes each additional dollar so that
3

Constantinides (1979) implements such a policy in the context of portfolio selection.

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cost-minimizing firms respond by making tiny leverage adjustments upon reaching a recapitalization boundary. These small adjustments return lever¯ ) and lead age to just inside the no-

recapitalization region (defined by L and L to leverage adjustments that are highly clustered in time. ¯ Panel C presents the results for a cost function consisting of both fixed and weakly convex

components. The optimal control policy in this case lies between that of the previous two. When leverage reaches a boundary, the size of the adjustment is such that leverage returns to

somewhere between the fixed cost optimum and the closest boundary. For example, when leverage hits the up¯ , firms adjust so that leverage returns to L ¯ ∗ . The fixed cost per boundary L

induces firms to make a large enough adjustment so that the benefit of adjusting overcomes the fixed component of the cost function. However, the convex cost penalizes each additional

dollar. Thus, the size and frequency of leverage adjustments fall somewhere in between the two extremes illustrated in Panels A and B. Figure 1 reveals several implications of adjustment costs

that are relevant for the empirical analysis of capital structure. First, the persistence of shocks on the leverage process is insufficient to reject the notion that firms dynamically rebalance their

capital structures. Under each cost regime discussed above, shocks to leverage do not induce a response as long as the leverage process remains in the no-recapitalization region. Further, the

size of the response need not completely offset the shock, thereby returning leverage to its preshock level. Second, the structure of adjustment costs dictates the size and frequency of

adjustments. As adjustment costs transition from fixed (Panel A), to fixed plus convex (Panel C), to proportional (Panel B), we see the size of adjustment decrease and the frequency of adjustment

increase. Finally, examination of the temporal or cross-sectional variation in the level of (or change in) leverage can be misleading when it comes to inferring financing behavior. Two otherwise

identical firms, both following the same dynamic optimizing strategy, can have different leverage dynamics and debt ratios simply due to different random shocks to their capital structures. In

order to understand the motives behind corporate financial policy, we must focus on the determination of the adjustments themselves (i.e., why firms adjust when they do). II. Recent Empirical

Evidence in Light of Adjustment Costs A. Market Timing The fact that firms time markets in their security issuance decisions is well documented.4 However, the contention of Baker and Wurgler

(2002) is that equity market timing has an important and lasting impact on corporate capital structure. Specifically, they argue that firms fail to rebalance their leverage after issuing equity in

an attempt to time the market. Consequently, capital structure is the cumulative result of attempts to time equity markets and firms
4

See the introductory discussion in Baker and Wurgler (2002).

Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures?

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are no more or less likely to adjust their leverage in response to these timed equity issuances.5 We look more closely at Baker and Wurgler’s conclusions by performing a nonparametric analysis

of the leverage response of equity issuing firms, as well as examining the impact of introducing adjustment costs into their empirical framework. To do so, we begin by replicating, as closely as

possible, the sample of firms from the annual COMPUSTAT files used by Baker and Wurgler.6 A.1. Equity Issuers vs. Nonissuers For each year, we stratify the sample into four portfolios based on

the median asset size of the firm (big and small) and the median market-to-book ratio of the firm (high and low), where the market-to-book ratio is defined as the ratio of total assets minus book

equity plus market equity all divided by total assets. Within each of these portfolios, the sample is split between those firms that issued equity during the year and those that did not. (Our

identification of equity issuances is discussed in detail below.) Holding the firms in these portfolios constant, we track the average difference between the leverage of the issuers and nonissuers

over the next five years. To clarify, in 1990, for example, we form four size/market-to-book portfolios based on 1989 end-of-year characteristics. Within each portfolio, we then compute the

average difference in leverage between those firms that issued equity in 1990 and those that did not. We follow these same portfolios of firms over the next five years, recomputing the

difference in leverage at each point in time. We also present the difference in leverage for the year prior to the issuance. We repeat this exercise for all other years in the sample (1975–1995) and

then average across event times (i.e., start of the issue period, end of the issue period, one year after the issue period, etc.). The goal of this exercise is to determine if equity issuers in each of

the four portfolios respond to the issuance by subsequently increasing their leverage relative to the nonissuers, which act as a control group.7 Panel A of Figure 2 presents the results, which

reveal that following the drop at issuance, the leverage of the equity issuers in each portfolio gradually increases relative to the nonissuers. For example, among large firms with low market-to-

book ratios, equity issuers have an average leverage that is 6.2% lower than their nonissuing counterparts immediately after the issuance (period zero). Two years later, that difference is

reduced to 1%. Within four years
5 We note that the recent paper by Hennessy and Whited (2005) generates empirical implications similar to those identified by Baker and Wurgler in a framework absent opportunistic behavior. 6

Specifically, we start with all nonfinancial, nonutility firms listed on COMPUSTAT prior to 2000 and drop firms with missing values for book assets or with a minimum value for book assets of less

than $10 million. We verify the similarity of our sample to Baker and Wurgler’s by closely reproducing most of their major findings. 7 We perform this analysis in two ways. First, we control for

survivors so that the portfolios are unchanged for the entire period of observation (i.e., before the issuance through the following six years). These results are presented in Figures 2 through 4.

Second, we allow firms to drop out of the sample (e.g., due to bankruptcy). The results are similar and, as such, not presented.

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Panel A: Difference in Market Leverage between Equity Issuers and Nonissuers

4% 2% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8%
Event Years

Pre

0

1

2

3

4

5

Small, Low M/B Small, High M/B Big, Low M/B Big, High M/B

Panel B: Difference in the Percentage of Firms Issuing Debt between Equity Issuers and Nonissuers

14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 1 2 3
Event Years

Small, Low M/B Small, High M/B Big, Low M/B Big, High M/B

4

5

Figure 2. Response to equity issuances. The sample is selected from annual COMPUSTAT data in a manner consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2002). Specifically, we start with all nonfinancial,

nonutility firms listed on COMPUSTAT prior to 2000 and drop firms with missing values for book assets or with a minimum value for book assets of less than $10 million. Each year, the entire

sample is stratified into four portfolios based on the median asset size (big and small) and median market-to-book ratio (high and low) of the firm. Within each of these portfolios, the sample is

split between those firms that issued equity and those that did not. Holding the firms in these portfolios constant, we track the average difference between the market leverage of the issuers

and nonissuers over the next 5 years. To clarify, in 1990, for example, we form four size/market-to-book portfolios based on firm characteristics at the end of 1989 and compute the average

difference in leverage between those firms that issued equity in 1990 and those that did not within each of the four portfolios. We then follow these same portfolios of firms over the next 5 years

(and previous year), recomputing the difference in the leverage at each point in time. We repeat this exercise for each year from 1975 through 1995 and then average across event times (i.e.,

start of the issue period, end of the issue period, 1 year after the issue period, etc.). These results are presented in Panel A. Panel B presents the difference of the fraction of firms among the

equity issuers and nonissuers that subsequently issue debt.

after the issuance, all four groups of equity issuers have rebalanced away any effects of the issuance, relative to their control group of nonissuers. Panel B shows that this increase in leverage

among equity issuers is due, at least in part, to debt issuance activity. Panel B compares the fraction of equity issuers,

Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures?

2583

relative to nonissuers, that subsequently issue debt in each year after the equity issuance. The interpretation is that those firms that issue equity are subsequently more likely to issue debt,

relative to similar nonissuing counterparts, in the years following the equity issuance.8 This is precisely what dynamic rebalancing predicts. Given the rebalancing evidence in Figure 2, we

examine whether Baker and Wurgler’s market timing variable, the external finance-weighted average market-to-book ratio (EFWA), is capturing something other than just historical market timing

efforts.9 We begin by illustrating the intuition of their result in Panel A of Figure 3, which presents a comparison of leverage for firms with high and low EFWA (relative to the median). The figure

shows that high EFWA firms tend to have relatively low leverage for an extended period. Using an approach inspired by the recent study of Kayhan and Titman (2003), Panels B, C, and D replicate

the analysis of Panel A, comparing, respectively, the leverage of groups distinguished by their past equally weighted average market-to-book ratio (high versus low), the number of times per

year they have issued equity in the past (many versus few), and the size of past equity issuances (large versus small). As before, we use medians to distinguish between each group. Panel B shows

that in general, firms with a high historical average market-to-book tend to have persistently low leverage. However, when we compare the leverage of those firms that have done a lot of equity

issuing with those that have not (Panel C), we see a negligible difference in leverage that is eventually erased for all but one of the portfolios. Similarly, comparing firms that issue large and small

amounts of equity reveals that differences in leverage are modest and are erased fairly quickly, except for small low market-to-book firms. Thus, the Baker and Wurgler result is not one of

unresponsiveness to equity issuances (clear from Figure 2), but rather a natural tendency for firms with high average market-to-book ratios to maintain low levels of leverage. A.2. Adjustment

Costs and Market Timing We now examine the impact that adjustment costs have on the empirical results of Baker and Wurgler (2002). Their primary analysis consists of crosssectional

regressions of leverage on EFWA and several empirical proxies for determinants of capital structure.10 The statistical (and economic) significance
Note that equity issuing firms may still be more likely to issue equity again relative to their nonissuing counterparts. This outcome is a natural consequence of the clustering of adjustments

discussed earlier in the context of Figure 1, and says nothing about whether or not firms are rebalancing. Rather, the relevant comparison is whether equity issuing firms are more likely to issue

debt after issuing equity than before. 9 The EFWA is defined as
t −1 s=0 8

Net Equity Issueds + Net Debt Issueds
t −1 r =0

·

Net Equity Issuedr + Net Debt Issuedr

Market Value of Assetss Book Value of Assetss

.

(A4)

10 The proxies that they include in their regressions are profitability (earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by total assets), size (log of net sales), asset tangibility (net plant,

property, and equipment divided by total assets), and the market-to-book ratio defined above.

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of the EFWA variable over various horizons is interpreted as evidence that the effect of historical valuations is large and distinct from other determinants of capital structure. Additionally, Baker

and Wurgler argue that the effect is also persistent, showing that historical market-to-book variation remains a strong determinant of the cross-sectional variation in leverage ratios even after

10 years have passed. The discussion in the previous section suggests that persistence in the leverage process is a natural consequence of costly adjustment but this persistence may be

mitigated for firms facing lower costs of adjustment. That is, firms with a relatively low cost of adjustment will be more likely to respond to shocks, all else being equal, than firms with high

costs of adjustment. Visually, low adjust¯ in Figure 1) that ment cost firms have recapitalization boundaries ( L and L ¯ are relatively close together. We can translate this prediction into Baker

and Wurgler’s empirical framework outlined above by examining the impact of adjustment costs on the EFWA coefficient. For firms with high (low) adjustment costs associated with debt

Panel A: Difference in Market Leverage between High and Low EFWA Firms 0% -5% -10% -15% -20% -25% -30% Event Years Small, Low M/B Small, High M/B Big, Low M/B Big, High M/B 1 2 3 4 5

Figure 3. The leverage of high and low EFWA firms. The sample is selected from annual COMPUSTAT data in a manner consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2002). Specifically, we start with all

nonfinancial, nonutility firms listed on COMPUSTAT prior to 2000 and drop firms with missing values for book assets or with a minimum value for book assets of less than $10 million. Each year,

the entire sample is stratified into four portfolios based on the median asset size of the firm (big and small) and the median market-to-book ratio of the firm (high and low). Within each of these

four portfolios, the sample is split between those firms with a high and low (above and below median) lagged value for Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) external finance-weighted average market-to-

book (EFWA). Holding firms in the four size/market-to-book portfolios constant, we track the average difference between the market leverage of these two groups within each of the four

portfolios over the next four years. To clarify, in 1990, for example, we form four size/market-to-book portfolios based on firm characteristics at the end of 1989 and compute the average

difference in leverage between the high and low EFWA firms in each of the four portfolios. We then follow these same portfolios of firms over the next four years, recomputing the difference in the

leverage at each point in time. We repeat this exercise for each year from 1975 through 1995 and then average across event times. These results are presented in Panel A. Panels B, C, and D

replicate the analysis of Panel A, comparing, respectively, the leverage of groups distinguished by the average of their historical market-to-book values (high versus low), the number of times per

year they have issued equity in the past (many versus few), and the average size of past equity issuances relative to book assets (large versus small). We use medians to distinguish between

groups within each portfolio.

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