case study

case study

answer the questions below. Please make sure your responses are comprehensive and reflect a high level of integration of the course readings and textual material.
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The Case:
As a result of activities within the Abu-Ghraib prison, Donald Rumsfeld faced circumstances that were arguably as grave as any leader will ever encounter. The result of his actions, both in his oversight as Secretary of Defense and the ensuing allegations of abuse revealed in the media, have serious implications for the reputation and security of the United States, and for the view of citizens towards their government. Please answer the following (either separately or integrated into one essay):
1. What were the principal factors that led to the abuse at Abu-Ghraib prison?
2. What were the major ethical and leadership concerns raised in this case and how well did Rumsfeld and others in Department of Defense chain of command handle them?
3. Use the Triadic Model presented by Bowman and West to analyze this case. For example, how might someone utilize a utilitarian perspective to perceive the events in this case and justify some of the decisions made by the leadership hierarchy within the Department of Defense? How might this analysis be altered if one employed a deontological framework and/or virtue theory?
4. Now that we have had a chance to look back at this fiasco, what specific strategies would you propose to ensure this never happens again? What changes would you make to prison operations? What changes would you suggest in terms of both policies and decision making processes?
The Case:
Case Teaching Resources FROM TH E E V A N S S C H O O L O F P U B L I C A F F A I R S
DONALD RUMSFELD AND PRISONER ABUSE AT ABU GHRAIB

Facing the Senate Armed Services Committees on May 7, 2004, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld responded to the question of whether he would resign over the recently
exposed prisoner abuse allegations in Iraq: “Needless to say, if I felt I could not be
effective, I’d resign in a minute. I would not resign simply because people are trying to
make a political issue out of it” (1). A political issue it would inevitably become, as a scant
six months remained before the presidential election. The war in Iraq already proved to
be a central theme, and a polarized electorate threatened to magnify the political
implications. Haunting images of torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib, the prison once
notorious for Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s cruelty to his own people, were first
released during the airing of CBS’s Sixty Minutes II, on April 28, 2004. Soldiers had
gathered and shared these pictures on discs, via e-mail, and even used them as screen
savers on computers within interrogation rooms. The images depicted naked prisoners
forced into sexual positions, crawling on the floor, handcuffed to other naked prisoners,
or standing with their arms secured above their heads for hours or days on end. The
images further revealed soldiers threatening naked prisoners with military dogs and
prisoners wearing hoods—their genitals attached to electric wires. Some were bruised,
slashed, and even shot to death. The pictures—utterly graphic, shocking, and
undeniable—evoked visceral reactions around the world.
President Bush and members of Congress claimed they were not briefed about the
problems or allegations before CBS released pictures to television audiences, news
organizations, and internet viewers worldwide. As events continued to unfold in the
news, questions about the training and supervision of the prison guards emerged. From
Senate hearings and call-in radio shows, American allies and Arab populations, a volley
of voices demanded answers. Who should be held accountable for the guards’ actions?
Were they instructed to abide by the Geneva Conventions? Why were they taking
pictures? What indication did they have from superiors that this was appropriate
behavior? What implications would the revelations have for American support for the
war in Iraq, for the presidential election campaign, and perhaps more importantly, for
1 Donald Rumsfeld video clip, CNN Larry King Live, Transcript #050700CN.V22, p. 5, May 7, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
2
America’s image on a global scale? These questions prompted many commentators, such
as CNN’s Larry King to ask, “Does someone big have to go?” (2)
The Taguba Report
While top officials and politicians apparently remained unaware of events that would
soon unfold in a political crisis, military officials had already begun proceeding with
investigations. On January 19, 2004, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7)
Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo Sanchez, commander of U.S. military forces in Iraq,
requested that higher authorities at U.S. Central Command appoint an Investigating
Officer to “conduct an investigation into the allegations of detainee abuse at the Abu
Ghraib Prison, which was also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility” (3).
According to the New York Times, the investigation resulted from pictures and a report
submitted anonymously just six days earlier by Army Specialist Joseph Darby, a reservist
serving in the 372nd Military Police (MP) Company at Abu Ghraib (4).
The order to investigate from Central Command charged Major General Antonio Taguba
with investigating allegations of abuse, as well as directing him to inquire into
accountability lapses and escapes at the prison, general training and standards, internal
procedures and command policies within the 800th MP Brigade, in charge of the prison
system in Iraq. The report, completed in early March 2004, revealed a disturbing account
of leadership failure, and called into question how high the level of culpability would
rise.
MG Taguba’s report generally corroborated operational failures outlined in an earlier
report by Major General Donald Ryder, submitted November 5, 2003. As Commander of
the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, MG Ryder reported on prison
operations in Iraq. Although the two reports alleged similar operational problems, they
diverged on two important points. The Ryder Report indicated that no abuse or
mistreatment had taken place, and concluded that “military police were not asked to help
prepare prisoners for interrogations” as alleged in the later Taguba Report (5). MG
Taguba’s Report was leaked to the press in May 2004, and detailed the abuses only
recently revealed to the public as follows:
“That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement
Facility (BCCF) numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal
abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and illegal abuse of
detainees was perpetrated by several members of the military police guard force
(372md Military Police Company, 320th Military Police Battalion, 800th MP
Brigade…. The allegations of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness
2 Larry King, commentator, CNN Larry King Live, Transcript #050700CN.V22, p. 14, May 7, 2004
3 Major General Antonio Taguba, Testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee, CNN Transcript
#051101CN.V54, p 13, May 11, 2004.
4 Kate Zernike, “Only a Few Spoke Up on Abuse As Many Soldiers Stayed Silent”, Section A Column 1,
May 22, 2004.
5 Ted Bridis, “Conflict Seen for General in Abuse Probe”, The Associated Press, June 2, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
3
statements (Annex 26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic
evidence.”6
“I find that the intentional abuse of the detainees by military police personnel
included the following acts:
a. Punching, slapping and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet;
b. Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;
c. Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for
photographing;
d. Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several
days at a time;
e. Forcing naked male detainees to wear women’s underwear;
f. Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being
photographed and videotaped;
g. Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;
h. Positioning a naked male detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head,
and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis, to simulate electric torture;
i. Writing “I am a Rapest” (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have forcibly
raped a 15-year-old fellow detainee; and then photographing him naked;
j. Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee’s neck and having a
female Soldier pose for a picture;
k. A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;
l. Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten
detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;
m. Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees;”7
The Taguba Report also examined numerous escapes, riots, beatings, and shootings that
took place at Abu Ghraib. There were accounts of detainee-on-detainee fighting,
smuggled weapons within the prison, and prison guards forced to use, on occasion, lethal
force to retain control. The details in the report indicated a general sense of lawlessness
and chaos within the prison.
The Geneva Convention
According to the Geneva Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the actions
of the United States in a sovereign nation such as Iraq, are bound by the Convention, as a
High Contracting Party to the agreement. The following articles outline these obligations:
Article 2
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed
6 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
One, p. 16, March, 2004.
7 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
One, pp. 16-17,. March, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
4
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall
also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their
mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation
to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
Article 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(b) Taking of hostages;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples (8).
Conditions at Abu Ghraib
Military officials, and ultimately members of Congress, the public, and Secretary
Rumsfeld, concurred that the Geneva Convention was clearly violated on certain
occasions at Abu Ghraib. What was less clear were the circumstances that fostered this
type of treatment. MG Taguba’s report revealed a lack of leadership and operational
integrity under the command of Brigadier General (BG) Janis Karpinski, Commander of
the 800th Military Police Brigade. MG Taguba’s report revealed some disturbing
indications that this type of behavior was at best condoned, and at worst ordered, by top
military brass, officials in the Department of Defense or the Bush Administration. The
culture and operations of the prison would ultimately complicate the determination of
8 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
5
whether these actions were aberrant, unsupervised acts by a handful of soldiers, or
whether the responsibility lay much higher up the chain of command.
Following are excerpts from MG Taguba’s report (bold face original) (9):
Training
“I find that prior to its deployment in Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company had received no training in
detention/internee operations . I also find that very little instruction or training
was provided to MP personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-
19.40. Moreover, I find that few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were
ever made available to MP personnel or detainees” (10).
“Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI Soldiers at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF) received regular training on the basics of detainee operations; however,
they have been unable to produce any verifying documentation, sign-in rosters, or
soldiers who can recall the content of this training” (11).
Standard Operating Procedures
“There is a general lack of knowledge, implementation, and emphasis of basic
legal, regulatory, doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP
Brigade, and its subordinate units” (12).
“The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after in-processing was
inconsistent from detention facility to detention facility, compound to compound,
encampment to encampment, and even shift to shift throughout the 800th MP
Brigade AOR” (13).
“Accountability and facility operations SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures)
lacked specificity, implementation measures, and a system of checks and balances
to ensure compliance” (14).
9 Excerpts arranged in categories by the case author.
10 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
One, pp. 19-20. March, 2004.
11 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, pp. 26,. March, 2004.
12 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 22,. March, 2004.
13 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 23. March, 2004.
14 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 24. March, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
6
“The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely
held persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) without
accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their
detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib
called these detainees “ghost detainees.” On at least one occasion, the 320th MP
Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of “ghost detainees” (6-8) for OGAs that
they moved around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was deceptive,
contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law” (15).
Prison Crowding
“The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca [a higher security, smaller prison located in
Baghdad] Detention Facilities are significantly over their intended maximum
capacity while the guard force is undermanned and under resourced. This
imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and
accountability lapses at the various facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities
also limits the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the detainee population
who may be organizing escapes and riots within the facility” (15).
“The screening, processing, and release of detainees who should not be in custody
takes too long and contributes to the overcrowding and unrest in the detention
facilities. There are currently three separate release mechanisms in the theaterwide
internment operations. First, the apprehending unit can release a detainee if
there is a determination that their continued detention is not warranted. Secondly,
a criminal detainee can be released after it has been determined that the detainee
has no intelligence value, and that their release would not be detrimental to
society. BG Karpinski had signature authority to release detainees in this second
category. Lastly, detainees accused of committing “Crimes Against the
Coalition,” who are held throughout the separate facilities in the CJTF-7 AOR can
be released upon a determination that they are of no intelligence value and no
longer pose a threat to Coalition Forces. The release process for this category of
detainee is a screening by the local US Forces Magistrate Cell and a review by a
Detainee Release Board consisting of BG Karpinski, COL Marc Warren, SJA,
CJTF-7, and MG Barbara Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is the “Detainee Release
Authority” for detainees being held for committing crimes against the coalition.
According to BG Karpinski, this category of detainee makes up more than 60% of
the total detainee population, and is the fastest growing category. However, MG
Fast, according to BG Karpinski, routinely denied the board’s recommendations
to release detainees in this category who were no longer deemed a threat and
clearly met the requirements for release. According to BG Karpinski, the
15 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 26 March, 2004
16 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 25, March, 2004
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
7
extremely slow and ineffective release process has significantly contributed to the
overcrowding of the facilities” (17).
Culture
“Operational journals at the various compounds and the 320th Battalion TOC
contained numerous unprofessional entries and flippant comments, which
highlighted the lack of discipline within the unit. There was no indication that the
journals were ever reviewed by anyone in their chain of command” (18).
“Basic Army Doctrine was not widely reinforced or utilized to develop the
accountability practices throughout the 800th MP Brigade’s subordinate units.
Daily processing, accountability, and detainee care appears to have been made up
as the as the operations developed with reliance on, and guidance from, junior
members of the unit who had civilian corrections experience” (19).
“In general, US civilian contract personnel (Titan Corporation, CACI, etc…),
third country nationals, and local contractors do not appear to be properly
supervised within the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During our on-site
inspection, they wandered about with too much unsupervised free access in the
detainee area. Having civilians in various outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about
the detainee area causes confusion and may have contributed to the difficulties in
the accountability process and with detecting escapes”(20).
Accountability
“There was a severe lapse of accountability of detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison
Complex. The 320th MP Battalion used a self-created “change sheet” to document
the transfer of a detainee from one location to another. For proper accountability,
it is imperative that these change sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be
updated in within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process would
often take as long as 4days to complete and resulted in inaccurate Internment
Serial Number (ISN) counts, gross differences in the detainee manifest and the
actual occupants of an individual compound, and significant confusion of the MP
soldiers…” (21).
17 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 25, March, 2004.
18 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 24, March, 2004.
19 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 24, March, 2004.
20 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 26, March, 2004.
21 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 23, March, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
8
”Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations from various 15-6
Investigations concerning escapes and accountability lapses) were rubber stamped
as approved and ordered implemented by BG Karpinski. There is no evidence that
the majority of her orders directing the implementation of substantive changes
were ever acted upon. Additionally, there was no follow-up by the command to
verify the corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and recommendations
contained within their own investigations been analyzed and actually
implemented by BG Karpinski, many of the subsequent escapes, accountability
lapses, and cases of abuse may have been prevented” (22).
Chain of Command
“SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in his sworn statement as
follows, “I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section, wing 1A, being made
to do various things I would question morally. In Wing 1A, we were told that
they had different rules, and different SOP for treatment. I never saw a set of
rules or SOP for that section just word of mouth. The Soldier In charge of 1A
was Corporal Granier. He stated that the agents and MI Soldiers would ask
him to do things, but nothing was ever in writing he could complain. (sic)”
When asked why the rules in 1A/1B were different than the rest of the wings,
SGT Davis stated: “The rest of the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B are
Military intelligence (MI) holds.” When asked why he did not inform his chain
commander about this abuse, SGT Davis stated: “Because I assumed that if they
were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone
would have said something. Also the wing belongs to MI and it appeared MI
personnel approved of the abuse.” SGT Davis also stated that he had heard MI
insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what MI said he stated:
“Loosen this guy up for us.” “Make sure he has a bad night.” “Make sure
he gets the treatment.” He claims these comments were made to CPL Granier
and SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT Davis stated that (sic): “the MI staffs to my
understanding have been giving Granier compliments on the way he has
been handling the MI holds. Example being statements like ‘Good job,
they’re breaking down real fast.’ ‘They answer every question.’ ‘They’re
giving out good information, Finally, and Keep up the good work’. Stuff like
that” (23).
“I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8, and the finding found in MG
Ryder’s Report, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US
Government Agency’s (OGA’s) interrogators actively requested that MP guards
set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses.
Contrary to the finding of MG Ryder’s Report, I find that personnel assigned to
the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility
22 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
Two, p. 25, March, 2004
23 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
One, pp. 18-19, March, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
9
procedures to “set the conditions” for MI interrogators. I find no direct evidence
that MP personnel actually participated in those MI interrogations” (24).
Prisoners of War, Terrorists, and Enemy Combatants
The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon of September 11, 2001 heralded
a new era of foreign policy and promised to define the Bush presidency. The Bush
Administration initiated a proactive war against terrorism, resolving to “hunt down and
punish” the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks and declared “those who are not with us are
against us.” The intensity of feeling generated by unprecedented terrorist attacks on
American soil, the scale of death and destruction, and the lawlessness of a stateless
enemy bred uncertainty about the rules of engagement. The need for intelligence, not just
to pursue the terrorists, but also to prevent further attacks on the U.S., brought pressure
on interrogators to produce results.
Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters captured in the ensuing war in Afghanistan and held at the
U.S. Navy base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were not afforded protections according to
the Geneva Convention. Al Qaeda was deemed not to be a nation, and “the Taliban lost
its right to prisoner of war status because it did not wear uniforms, did not operate under
responsible commanders, and systematically violated the laws of war” (25). The
proceduresfor treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, however, were reportedly
“consistentwith, but not pursuant to” the Geneva Convention. An April 2003 memo from
the Administration recommended to Donald Rumsfeld that he “approve a full range of 35
(interrogation) techniques. Nine were for exceptional use only, including slapping, sleep
deprivation, hooding, and use of dogs to induce fear” (26). Military lawyers expressed
concern about the basis of these recommendations and alarm that their civilian
counterparts within the Department of Defense were handing down recommendations
that placed obtaining information about terrorist activity as a first priority (27).
The same Administration memo also “warned Rumsfeld of a potential backlash if the
more aggressive techniques were used: If the treatment became public, it is likely to be
exaggerated or distorted in the U.S. and international media accounts, undermining
support for the war on terrorism. Moreover, U.S. officials could be subject to human
rights prosecutions abroad and the tactics could be used to justify mistreatment of
captured American soldiers. Two weeks later, Rumsfeld struck down 11 of the (35)
techniques recommended for his approval” (28).
24 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
One, pp. 18, March, 2004.
25 John C. Yoo, Law Professor UC Berkley, “Commentary; With ‘All Necessary and Appropriate Force’; In
interrogations, U.S. actions align with treaties and Congress’ wishes. Los Angels Times, Part B Page 13,
June 11, 2004.
26 Charlie Savage and Bryan Bender, “Policy Rift Seen on Detainees”, The Boston Globe, Page A1, June
24, 2004.
27 Charlie Savage and Bryan Bender, “Policy Rift Seen on Detainees”, The Boston Globe, Page A1, June
24, 2004.
28 Charlie Savage and Bryan Bender, “Policy Rift Seen on Detainees”, The Boston Globe, Page A1, June
24, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
10
A June 8, 2004 article in the Financial Times reported accusations that decisions and
policies set forth in a series of memos by officials in the Bush Administration had set a
precedent for abuse and torture.
“The administration of President George W. Bush was accused on
Tuesday by some members of Congress of sanctioning torture by preparing legal
analyses that said harsh treatment of detainees was permissible under U.S. and
international laws.
The charges come following the leak of memos from 2002 and 2003 in
which senior lawyers from the justice and defense departments had concluded that
torture might be legally permitted as part of the war on terrorism.
In heated exchanges before the Senate judiciary committee, the charges
were angrily denied by John Ashcroft, the US attorney-general, who endorsed the
arguments contained in the administration’s memos” (29).
According to Major General Taguba’s testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, none of the prisoners in Iraq were considered “terrorists.” U.S. troops,
however, were facing increasing attacks in the Fall of 2003, and commanders stepped up
efforts to question thousands of detainees held at Abu Ghraib, in an attempt to get to the
root of a growing insurgency (30). “In Iraq last fall, directives on treatment of prisoners
were changed at least three times in six weeks. Some of the procedures authorized in Iraq
had been banned as too harsh months earlier at Guantanamo” (31). Military lawyers later
complained that the “Pentagon was creating an atmosphere of ambiguity,” and that the
resulting abuses at Abu Ghraib were “not an accident” (32).
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 11, 2004, Senator Levin
questioned Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone:
Levin: “Secretary Cambone, in an article from last Saturday’s Post, in April 2003,
The Defense Department approved about 20 interrogation techniques for use at
Guantanamo that permit revising normal sleep patterns of detainees, exposing
them to heat, cold, sensory assault. And the use of these techniques required the
approval of senior Pentagon officials and, in some cases, of Secretary Rumsfeld,
according to that article. These procedures, according to the Pentagon spokesman,
Bryan Whitman, are controlled and approved on a case by case basis. And then it
says that the defense and intelligence officials said that similar guidelines have
been approved for use on, quote, “high value detainees in Iraq, those suspected of
terrorism or of having knowledge of insurgency operations.” Is that true? Were
29 Edward Alden, “Bush team accused of Sanctioning Torture”, Financial Times, June 8, 2004.
30 Ken Silverstien, “U.S. Military Lawyers Felt ‘Shut Out’ of Prison Policy”, Los Angeles Times, Part A
Page 10, May 14, 2004.
31 Douglas Jehl, Eric Schmitt, Kate Zernicke, “U.S. Rules on Prisoners Seen as Back and Forth of Mixed
Messages to GI’s,” The New York Times, Section A, Page 7, June 22, 2004.
32 Ken Silverstien, “U.S. Military Lawyers Felt ‘Shut Out’ of Prison Policy”, Los Angeles Times, Part A
Page 10, May 14, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
11
those techniques adopted for Guantanamo and were they then used or accepted or
adopted in Iraq?”
Cambone: “There are command level guidelines for use in interrogation. They
are, in some cases, the same and in many cases not.”
Levin: “And finally, Mr. Secretary, you said that—you have decided right from
the beginning that the Geneva Convention would apply to our activities in Iraq.”
Cambone: “Yes, sir.”
Levin: “And yet, Secretary Rumsfeld repeatedly has made a distinction between
whether or not those Geneva Convention rules must be applied, whether people—
prisoners will be treated, quote, “pursuant to those rules or consistent with those
rules. And he said—this is just a few days ago—that “The Geneva Convention did
not apply precisely.”
Cambone: “Sir.”
Levin: “You, this morning, said again, “The Geneva Convention applies to our
activities in Iraq…”
Cambone: “In Iraq.”
Levin: “…. But not precisely?”
Cambone: “No, sir. I think what the secretary, I—let me tell you what the facts
are. The Geneva Convention applies in Iraq.”
Miller’s Mission
Under instruction by Secretary Cambone, Major General Geoffrey Miller, commander of
the U.S. detention center for terrorists in Guantanamo Bay, arrived at the Abu Ghraib
prison in September 2003. Although he was charged with helping to establish operational
procedures and processes, he was also directed to review “the current Iraqi Theater ability
to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence” (33). As a result of his visit, MG
Miller drafted 200 pages of operational recommendations to LTG Sanchez, which were
then passed down the chain of command (34). As a result, critics have charged that the goal
of his visit was to “Gitmoize” the operations of the prison. In a June 17, 2004 article, the
Financial Times reported:
33 Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part
One, p. 7, March, 2004
34 Eric Schmitt, “Two U.S. Generals Outline a Lag in Notification on Reports of Abuse In Iraq Prison”, The
New York Times, Section A, Page 12, May 20, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
12
“Maj. Gen. Miller has insisted his recommendations were limited to
reorganizing a chaotic detention system and fostering more cooperation between
MP’s and military intelligence interrogators. But in recent weeks, evidence has
emerged that his Guantanamo interrogation techniques were widely circulated in
Iraq—from documents that were posted on the walls of Abu Ghraib prison to
debates among senior military lawyers in Baghdad—in the days following his
departure.
Senior military officials have said that Maj. Gen. Miller handed out the
Guantanamo procedures to battalion commanders at Abu Ghraib, and Colonel
Marc Warren, the top lawyer on Gen. Sanchez’s staff, said they were among the
techniques included in a list of interrogation methods considered by military legal
advisers in Baghdad. The Washington Post reported last week that some
procedures appeared on a list of techniques approved by Gen. Sanchez the day
after Maj. Gen. Miller left, though Lt. Gen. Sanchez has said he never authorized
more extreme techniques such as the use of dogs against prisoners.
To Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, who was relieved of her command
of Iraqi prisons in the wake of the scandal, there is no question that Maj. Gen.
Miller’s trip—and the resulting move to give command oversight of the facility to
a military intelligence brigade—helped lead to the abuses by the 372nd MP
company. In a recent BBC interview she said, ‘Maj. Gen. Miller insisted prisoners
should be treated like dogs.’
The link to Maj. Gen. Miller is crucial. Through him, a direct line can be
drawn to the highest levels of the Pentagon, and in turn, the White House. But he
has vehemently denied that his recommendations condoned illegal behaviour and
senior military officials have rallied around him, attempting to discredit Brig.
Gen. Karpinski.
One fact remains undisputed: less than two months after his departure
from Iraq, the first of the shocking photographs were taken. Whether one event
helped cause the other is the question that could decide the fate of an
administration” (35).
The following exchange between Senator Kennedy and Secretary Cambone in the May
11, 2004 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, summarized the confusion of intent:
Kennedy: “Let me just ask you, finally, in the opinion of MG Taguba, the setting
of conditions for favorable interrogation is not authorized or consistent with Army
regulations. You seem to reach a different conclusion in your testimony today. Do
you agree—you and General Taguba there differ on that—those issues?
Correct?”
Cambone: “We do, and in this sense….”
Kennedy: “Well, I think it’s important that we understand when we were talking
about the abuses that are taking place with the military police and you have two
35 Edward Alden, Peter Spiegel, Demetri Sevastopulo, “Chain of Command: can torture in Iraq be linked to
the White House?”, The Financial Times, Comments and Analysis p. 21, June 17, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
13
entirely different kinds of viewpoints on this issue, how in the world are the
military police that are supposed to implement going to be able to get it straight,
particularly when you have General Miller there that is following what you
believe, Mr. Secretary? How do you expect the MP’s to get it straight if we have
a difference between the two of you?”
Cambone: Well let me try and explain it. As far as I understand it, there is
doctrine relative to the military police which gives them the responsibility for
conveying to the interrogators the attitudes of those who are going to be
interrogated, their disposition, who they’ve been talking to and so forth. And it’s
the interrogators, in turn, under doctrine, Army doctrine, ask the military police
those kinds of questions. So there is designed in the system a collaborative
approach with respect to getting that information.
With respect to the issue of “Gitmoizing,” if I may return to that, Senator
Kennedy, let’s go back to the conditions that were Abu Ghraib. They were
disorderly, as the general has pointed out, and the notion it seems to me that
General Miller had was that order needed to be established in the process and
procedures.”
International Committee of the Red Cross
According to the Geneva Convention, an impartial humanitarian body such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) “may offer its services to the Parties to
the conflict.” This broad mandate allows for aid and medical care to prisoners of war, as
well as reporting and oversight duties. The ICRC submitted a report outlining operational
problems and potential human rights violations on November 6, 2003, a day after the
Ryder Report was submitted. Together, these two reports showed “that the Army was put
on official notice about deep problems at Abu Ghraib two months before a prison guard
turned over photographs depicting the abuse, finally prompting a criminal
investigation” (36). According to Time magazine:
“Officials of the International Red Cross (ICRC) brought serious
allegations of abuse—which they are bound to keep confidential—to U.S.
attention beginning in October. Pierre Gassman, head of the ICRC delegation in
charge of Iraq, told Time that his team found credible, disturbing evidence of
mistreatment after interviewing virtually all the prisoners during that visit. The
Red Cross reported its findings to Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, the overall
prison commander, and to staff officers attached to the office of Lieut. General
Ricardo Sanchez, the top U.S. commander in Baghdad. In February, after more
interviews, Red Cross officials sent a comprehensive report directly to the staffs
of Sanchez, and L. Paul Bremer, head of the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority.
Later that month, Gassman met with Brenner and Sanchez. Gassman says he had
36 Richard Serrano, “General detailed Conditions at Prison: The findings and a Red Cross Report show
Army learned of problems months before inquiry”, Los Angeles Times, Part a page 8, June, 3, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
14
the impression that the officials were aware of the allegations of prison abuses
before he entered the room.
They were. For months Bremer’s authority had been hearing complaints
from released prisoners and families of those still in detention. The State
Department knew enough to realize, says a senior official, ‘this was going to be a
problem.’ Aides to Bremer and Secretary of State Colin Powell say that as early
as last fall, both men raised the issue in meeting with the rest of the
Administration’s national security team” (37).
Inside the Pentagon
A day or two after Army Specialist Joseph Darby submitted pictures on a compact disc
along with his anonymous report, General John Abizaid, Combatant Commander, Central
Command, put in a call to General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. General Abizaid described reports of abuse and mistreatment of prisoners at Abu
Ghraib, and about the disc. “Here is what basically the pictures might show,” General
Abizaid told General Myers, adding, “This is a big deal” (38).
MG Taguba completed and submitted his report in early March, yet even as the story of
prisoner abuse broke on CBS in late April, the report lay unread on the desks of Secretary
Rumsfeld and General Myers. Although the incriminating pictures had not yet surfaced
inside the Pentagon, General Myers, aware that CBS and Seymour Hersh of the New
Yorker were preparing stories about the issue, asked CBS to “hold off” on breaking the
story. The Pentagon gave no notice to the President or Congress about the impending
publicity of abuse at Abu Ghraib, even as Myers expressed concern to CBS for the safety
of soldiers in Iraq if the pictures became public. Not until the first week in May, 2004, in
preparation for his Congressional testimony, did Secretary Rumsfeld sit down at a
computer with General Myers to review the disc full of pictures (39).
Members of Congress asked for an explanation as to why they were not briefed about the
potential political crisis ahead of time. Secretary Rumsfeld admitted to having knowledge
about alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib, but added, “It is the photographs that gives one the
vivid realization of what actually took place. Words don’t do it” (40). He conceded, “I
failed to identify the catastrophic damage that the allegations of abuse could do to our
operations in the theater, to the safety of our troops in the field, to the cause to which we
are committed” (41).
Public Opinion
In an article titled “Winning In Iraq” (May 12, 2004) the Wall Street Journal reported
seven of ten Americans stated they believed the Iraq prison abuse allegations were a “big
37 “The Scandal’s Growing Stain”, Time, p. 30, May 17, 2004.
38 John Diamond, “Early signs were given secondary priority”, USA Today, Page 1A, May 10, 2004.
39 John Diamond, “Early signs were given secondary priority”, USA Today, Page 1A, May 10, 2004
40 Editorial, The Washington Post, Page A22, May 12, 2004.
41 “The Scandal’s Growing Stain”, Time p. 28, May 17, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
15
deal,” yet 69% said they wanted Secretary Rumsfeld to remain in office (42). According to
a May 14, 2004 article in Newsday,
“… the latest polls, as well as interviews with analysts in several key states, tell
much the same story: falling support for the administration’s Iraq policy, growing
pessimism about the general direction of the country and increased unhappiness
with Bush’s performance as president. A new poll by the Washington-based Pew
Research Center, for example, found that only 33 percent of those surveyed were
satisfied with conditions in the country and just 44 percent approved of Bush’s
performance, both record lows for his presidency. Similarly, a Gallup survey
found 37 percent satisfied with the course of events in the nation and 46 percent
approved of Bush’s performance.” In addition, both polls found that Americans
are paying great attention to the prison abuse scandal, and that it has depressed
support for the U.S. presence in Iraq. The Gallup survey, taken May 7-9, recorded
a 13-point negative swing from its previous poll May 2-4 on whether the war was
worth waging, with 54 percent now saying it was not. It found the public evenly
divided on whether to stay in Iraq or begin withdrawing, a 10-point swing from its
previous poll. The Pew poll, also taken May 7-9, found most believe the war is
not going well—but also that a majority still support keeping troops in Iraq until a
stable government is formed. ‘There’s been a softening of support, but the bottom
hasn’t fallen out,’ said Pew polling director Andrew Kohut” (43).
Perspectives and Politics
Although most Republicans joined Democrats in denouncing the abuse of prisoners and
expressing dismay about the scandal’s impact, the debate about the events was not
without partisan shadings. A May 7 MSNBC report quoted Senator Lindsey Graham
(R-S.C.): “We’re talking about rape and murder here, we’re not just talking abut giving
people a humiliating experience, we’re talking about rape and murder and some very
serious charges” (44). The same report noted the view of Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.):
“I’m gravely concerned that many Americans will have the same impulse as I did when I
saw those pictures and that is to turn away from (the Iraq war). We risk losing public
support for this conflict.”
Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry condemned the abuse in still harsher terms:
“These despicable actions have endangered the lives of our soldiers and, frankly, have
made their mission harder to accomplish. We cannot succeed in Iraq by abandoning the
values that define America” (45).
Some Republicans expressed “outrage over the outrage.” During the May 11, 2004
Senate Armed Services hearing, Senator Inhofe (R-Okla.) commented:
42 “Winning in Iraq”, Wall Street Journal, A14, May 12, 2004.
43 Peter Wallsten, “Confidence in Bush, Iraq War, is Sinking, Polls Show,” Newsday, May 14, 2004.
44 Tom Curry, “Scandal’s Fallout Worries Senators,” MSNBC, May 7, 2004.
45 Nedra Pickler, “Kerry Says He Would Demand Accountability,” Associated Press, May 7, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
16
Inhofe: “ …I have to say, and I’m probably not the only one up at this table that is
more outraged by the outrage than we are by the treatment.
The idea that these prisoners — you know, they’re not there for traffic violations.
If they’re in cellblock 1A or 1B, these prisoners — they’re murderers, they’re
terrorists, they’re insurgents. Many of them probably have American blood on
their hands. And here we’re so concerned about the treatment of those individuals.
And I hasten to say, yes, there are seven bad guys and gals that didn’t do what
they should have done. They were misguided. I think maybe even perverted. And
the things they did have to be punished, and they’re being punished. They’re being
tried right now and that’s all taking place.
* * * * *
Inhofe: “Mr. Chairman, I also am — I have to say when we talk about the
treatment of these prisoners that I would guess that these prisoners wake up every
morning thanking Allah that Saddam Hussein is not in charge of these prisons.
When he was in charge, they would take electric drills and drill holes through
hands, they would cut their tongues out; they would cut their ears off. We’ve seen
accounts of lowering their bodies into vats of acid. All of these things were taking
place.
This was the type of treatment that they had — and I would want everyone to get
this and read it. This is a documentary of the Iraq special report. It talks about the
unspeakable acts of mass murder, unspeakable acts of torture, unspeakable acts of
mutilation, the murdering of kids — lining up 312 little kids under 12 years old
and executing them.
Then, of course, what they do to Americans, too. There’s one story in here that
was in the — I think it was the New York Times, yes, on June 2nd. I suggest
everyone get that and read it. It’s about one of the prisoners who did escape as
they were marched out there blindfolded and put before mass graves and they
mowed them down and they buried them. This man was buried alive and he
clawed his way out and was able to tell his story.
And I ask Mr. Chairman, at this point in the record, that this account of the
brutality of Saddam Hussein be entered into the record and made a part of the
record.”
Warner: “Without objection, so ordered.”
Inhofe: “I am also outraged that we have so many humanitarian do- gooders right
now crawling all over these prisons looking for human rights violations while our
troops, our heroes, are fighting and dying, and I just don’t think we can take seven
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
17
— seven bad people. There are some 700 guards in Abu Ghraib. There are some
25 other prisons. “
* * * * *
About 15,000 guards altogether and seven of them did things they shouldn’t have
done. And they’re being punished for that. But what about some 300,000 have
been rotating through all this time, and they have — all the stories of valor are
there?
Now, one comment about Rumsfeld: A lot of them don’t like him. I’m sorry that
Senator McCain isn’t here because I just now said to him, Do you remember back
three years ago when Secretary Rumsfeld was up for confirmation? I said, These
guys aren’t going to like him because he doesn’t kowtow to them. He is not easily
intimidated. I’ve never seen Secretary Rumsfeld intimidated. And quite frankly, I
can’t think of any American today as qualified as Donald Rumsfeld is to prosecute
this war.”
According to a CNN.com article covering the May 11, 2004 Senate hearing:
“Inhofe also lashed out at Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry,
accusing his campaign of exploiting the issue with a fund-raising letter calling for
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation. There was no immediate
response to Inhofe from Kerry’s campaign…..
Democratic senators Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York and Evan Bayh
of Indiana appeared surprised at Inhofe’s remarks, and some other Republicans
disavowed them.
Sen. John McCain, R-Arizona, left the committee room during Inhofe’s
remarks. Asked outside the meeting room whether he agreed with Inhofe, McCain
replied, ‘No way.’ And Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-Arizona, said, ‘When you are
the good guys, you’ve got to act like the good guys.’ He added that the
investigation into prison abuse should ‘be bringing us together and not tearing us
apart’” (46).
Implications on a Global Level
During the weeks following the release of pictures revealing abuse at Abu Ghraib,
violence and insurgency in Iraq escalated. Two Americans were beheaded on videotape.
Kidnappings and murders of those perceived to be allied with the United States increased,
and insurgents promised to “treat Americans and their allies as the U.S. treated prisoners
at Abu Ghraib.” According to a Financial Times article:
“The growth in anti-American feeling is one of the biggest threats confronting the
world. The negative obsession with the U.S. in the west and elsewhere is
46 “GOP senator labels abused prisoners ‘terrorists’”, CNN.com, May 11, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
18
becoming a danger to western societies. The demonisation of America helps make
the “clash of civilizations” prophesied by Samuel Huntington, U.S. academic,
more likely than it would otherwise be” (47).
Even from an American perspective, the fallout from Abu Ghraib seemed to dim the
country’s light abroad. One of the justifications given by the Bush Administration for
engaging in the war in Iraq was the moral desire to make life better for an oppressed
people under the control of a cruel and ruthless dictator. Yet the pictures of abused
prisoners and smirking soldiers cheapened that justification and threatened to erode
American and allied support for the war effort. As Thomas Friedman stated in his New
York Times editorial column:
“We are in danger of losing more than just the war in Iraq. We are in danger of
losing America as an important moral authority and inspiration in the world. I
have never known a time in my life when America and its president were more
hated around the world” (48).
Acknowledging the backlash of anti-Americanism in Iraq and around the world, and an
increasing political rift at home, Senator John Warner (R-Va.), Chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, sought a path forward—focusing on how the crisis should be
handled. In reference to Rumsfeld’s testimony before the Committee on May 7, he
remarked,
“And he said, ‘The world’s going to have a chance to see democracy in action
here in the United States, and that is how we are, when we’re faced with a
problem, we look it square in the eye, we get the facts out, and we, as quickly as
possible, under the applicable laws and regulations, bring those accountable to
justice, and get it behind us.’ And I commend him for that particular
statement” (49).
Indeed, America’s uncommon practice of owning up to malfeasance and resolving it
through legal procedures found reflection abroad:
“In fact, virtually all of the American war crimes so far discovered are
known to the public because they were revealed by the Americans themselves in a
manner similar to what is now happening in the case of Abu Ghraib.
This fact must be kept in mind when we judge the Americans. They are
alone in regularly revealing their own wrongdoings to the world. No other nation
in history has proven to have the same courage. Even when their institutions fail,
individuals stand up. Not all soldiers, they have proven, are sadists and criminals.
47 Dominique Moisi, Senior Advisor, French Institute for International Relations, “Bring Back the America
We Loved and Respected”, The Financial Times, June 8, 2004.
48 Thomas Friedman, “Restoring Our Honor”, The New York Times, Section A, Column 5, Editorial Desk; p
35, May 6, 2004.
49 Senator John Warner, Chairman of the Armed Services committee, CNN Larry King Live, Transcript
#050700CN.V22, May 7, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
19
Instead, there are men of courage who had the guts to stand up for justice and
report suspected war crimes to their superiors. When that hasn’t worked, many of
them have gone to the press to make it all public
I cannot imagine any other army in the world where brave acts like this
could have happened with such regularity. In this aspect, at least, the US is
certainly unique and exemplary” (50).
Acknowledging the abuse of prisoners and holding people accountable, however, seemed
to fall short of satisfying critics around the world. The following excerpt from the same
newspaper, Egypt Today, indicated that only through an inherent change in broader
ideology would America again find favor:
“Since the end of April, the entire world has known what many of us have
suspected for more than two years: The United States is turning a blind eye to the
1949 Geneva Convention, treating its prisoners of war (POWs) in whatever
manner it sees as expedient
The result? America’s politicians and electorate alike are starting to wake
up to the fact that much of the rest of the world already unfriendly to the United
States since the Bush administration’s adoption of a bullying foreign policy is
turning against America. Where it was once possible even in the Arab world to
talk about liking America but hating its foreign policy, the currents of anger now
run deeper.
Pictures, as US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was forced to
admit before the US Congress in early May, speak louder than a thousand words.
And with the release of the Abu Ghraib photographs of tortured, abused,
humiliated and even murdered Iraqi prisoners the Bush administration’s policy is
now ‘off the rails’ before the entire world” (51).
On his May 7th evening program, Larry King asked the important question, “Where does
this (prisoner abuse in Iraq) leave us diplomatically?” (52). Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)
replied,
“I think just awful. I think we’re in one of the worst situations
diplomatically that we’ve ever been in, in terms of having any kind of moral high
ground around the world. And that’s why, again-look, I have no animus towards
Secretary Rumsfeld. He’s done some pretty darned good things as Secretary of
Defense.
But this situation is so bad and so deep that I don’t think we’re going to
send the right signals unless Secretary Rumsfeld does the proper thing, removes
himself from the situation, allow(s) a new Secretary of Defense to come in, and
really conduct a thorough investigation to get to the bottom of it. I believe that’s
the only thing that’s going to really get us over this” (53).
50 “The Lessons of Abu Ghraib”, Egypt Today, June 2, 2004.
51 “The Lessons of Abu Ghraib”, Egypt Today, June 2, 2004.
52 Larry King, commentator, CNN Larry King Live, Transcript #050700CN.V22, May 7, 2004.
53 Senator Tom Harkin, CNN Larry King Live, Transcript #050700CN.V22, May 7, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
20
Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), Chairman of the Terrorism sub-committee, responded,
“…we’ve got to be careful about the message we send. The secretary
expressed his contriteness. He’s apologized. He said he’s sorry and he’s going to
do some things to set it right. I think we have to be careful about the message we
send if we begin to divide the leadership of this country in ways that lead our
enemies to believe that they can defeat us because we’re weak, we’re no longer
unified, that our top guy had to resign or get fired.
This is pretty dangerous stuff. And calling for his resignation before he
had testified I thought was kind of going, you know, too far. So it seems to me we
ought to be careful here and understand that what we say will have consequences
abroad just as this horrible incident has had” (54).
The two months following the release of photographs depicting abuse at Abu Ghraib
yielded a firestorm of controversy and media coverage. The New York Times alone
printed over 150 articles related to the prisoner abuse. Radio shows, major network news,
and newspapers around the world covered the issue daily. Amidst the swirl of media
controversy, insurgency and violence in Iraq escalated to a frightening level, prompting
many Iraqis to claim they would feel safer if American troops left entirely. Troops braced
for escalating violence as the hour of handover to a sovereign Iraqi government drew
near. The events at Abu Ghraib threatened to symbolize the actions of the United States
in Iraq.
Morale among rank and file military had reached a low point during “Operation Iraqi
Freedom.” A June 4, 2004, Washington Post article claimed, “…the Army is on the
threshold of a far-reaching and potentially damaging institutional crisis” in the aftermath
of Abu Ghraib (55). According to a June 8, 2004, United Press International article:
“Moderate Republicans in Congress have increasingly turned against the
Secretary—some like Sens. Chuck Hagel R-Neb, and John McCain R-Ariz.,
publicly; but increasing numbers are quietly lobbying key Bush adviser Karl Rove
to push for Rumsfeld’s ouster. They are most upset, say sources purporting to
know, with the impact of the Abu Ghraib fallout on expected international support
for the post-transition Iraqi government—prospects for NATO peacekeepers and
further international financing have sharply diminished—and the requests for
expanding congressional financing for the war on terror, especially in an election
year. Many believe Rumsfeld’s continued role in the administration will adversely
affect their ability to win seats in November” (56).
As he faced the Senate Armed Services Committee, Rumsfeld shouldered the blame,
stating, “In recent days, there has been a good deal of discussion about who bears
54 Senator Jon Kyl, Chairman Terrorism Sub-committee, CNN Larry King Live, Transcript
#050700CN.V22, May 7, 2004.
55 Cooper, “The Prism of Abu Ghraib”, Washington Post Editorial, A23, June 4, 2004.
56 Ian Bremmer, “Outside View: Whither Rumsfeld?”, United Press International, June 8, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
21
responsibility for the activities that took place at Abu Ghraib. These events occurred on
my watch. As Secretary of Defense, I am accountable for them, and I take full
responsibility” (57). Washington correspondent for Time magazine, Michael Weisskopf,
said of Rumsfeld’s testimony before Congress, “He was contrite. He was not as
dismissive. He was respectful. This was not vintage Rummy before Congress. This was a
man who realized that his own career and his own standing in the administration
depended a great deal on how well he performed” (58).
Although President Bush resolutely declared support for Rumsfeld, saying “He is doing a
superb job,” some questioned whether that support was sustainable as a presidential
election in November drew near. With Americans increasingly growing uncomfortable
about what was being done in their name, and how their role would be interpreted across
the globe, Rumsfeld was left with the challenge of crafting a strategy to ensure that he
could “continue to be effective.”
57 Donald Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Forces Committee Hearing, May 7, 2004.
58 Michael Weisskopf, Sr. Correspondent for Time Magazine, CNN Larry King Live, Transcript
#050700CN.V22, May 7, 2004.
Donald Rumsfeld and Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib
22
Glossary of Terms
AOR—Area of Operations
AR—Army Regulations
BCCF—Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (Abu Ghraib)
BG—Brigadier General
COL—Colonel
CPL—Corporal
CJTF-7—Combined Joint Task Force
FM—Field Manual
ICRC—International Committee of the Red Cross
ISN—Internment Serial Number
JIDC—Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
LTG—Lieutenant General
MG—Major General
MI—Military Intelligence
MP—Military Police
MRE—Meals Ready to Eat
OGA—Other Government Agency
SJA—Staff Judge Advocate
SGT—Sergeant
SSG—Staff Sergeant
TOC—Tactical Operations Center

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