“‘In British constitutional theory and practice there is a clear-cut distinction between law and convention. Law derives from common law and statute, and is enforceable by the courts. Convention derives from constitutional principle and practice and is not enforceable by the courts. Law remains in force until changed by statute. Convention may change with changing times. Law, at least if statutory, is ascertainable in precise form. Convention is often imprecise and may be nowhere formulated in categorical terms.’ (Professor H.W.R. Wade) – Is this an accurate explanation of the distinctive nature of law and convention in relation to the British constitution?”

Dicey probably gave the most accurate description of what conventions actually are when he stated that  “conventions [are] understandings, habits, or practices which, though they may regulate the conduct of the several members of the sovereign power, of the Ministry, or of other officials, are not in reality laws at all since they are not enforced by the courts.” Dicey then sees them as being very distinct from the law, which, no matter what, be adhered to by the courts (within the scope of theirs powers of statutory interpretation).  A prime example of this is how the courts ability, under Section 4 of the Human rights act 1998, to declare a statute incompatible with the European Convention, is marred by the fact…(short extract)